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Full text of "Poland Russia and Great Britain 1941-1945"

over was only a provisional line and not in the least definite . . .
" Mention has been made of the Lublin Committee. I leave that, because,
in my opinion, the question of the Lublin Committee is much less important
than the question of frontiers., for this reason : A country cannot have
independence, it cannot have an independent Government, unless its fron-
tiers are assured, and in my opinion the Lublin Committee was never
regarded seriously by the Russians and was merely put up as a stalking horse
to give what they thought they wanted so far as boundaries were concerned,
I think my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State, and, indeed, the Prime
Minister, in Moscow were perhaps not very wise in paying too much
attention to and in treating the Lublin Committee too seriously as they
appear to have done. The Lublin Committee is utterly fictitious, and the
Russians know perfectly well, just the same as everybody else does, that the
Lublin Committee is bogus and was utterly unnecessary except in order to
achieve a certain ulterior purpose.
" What is the final suggestion ? It is that Poland is to lose half her terri-
tory, and that she will lose one-third of her population. Apparently the
plea is that that is necessary in order to give defence in depth to Moscow.
We, whose armies, with the American Armies, are engaged in operations
for the defence of the Low Countries, might just as well say that we, who
have experienced war at the gates of our country, will remain in occupation
there after this war, because we require defence in depth for London.
What a cry would arise, not only from the Belgians but from the French,
our own people, and indeed the Russians, if we made such a monstrous
suggestion."
Mr. Austin HopMnson (Mossley) : " My hon. Friend has forgotten
another point, which would make his analogy complete. Not only should
we take part of the country which we have occupied, but, also, we should
say to the Government of the remainder of the country that they would
meet only with our approval."
Air. Petherick : "... It is suggested that East Prussia should be given
to Poland as compensation. But the Poles do not want East Prussia as
compensation. It is the same as if you took away East Anglia from Britian,
and gave it to Germany, and offered us Normandy instead. It is a monstrous
suggestion ... If Great Britain, America, Russia, and France can stand
together, the peace of Europe is assured for 100 years to come, but if all
that happens is that one aggressor is completely ground in the dust and there
is another aggressor arising in Europe, we cannot look forward to peace,
not only for a 100 years, but for a single day. The greatest British interest
is British honour, and we were deeply committed to Poland when we came
into this war. There will be no peace in Europe, or in the world, unless,
as a result of the Russian policy in respect of Poland, it is clear to the whole
world that power is only the man-at-arms of justice."
The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Mr. Eden) : " I come
to the main issue of the Debate, the Polish-Soviet relations and the problem
that underlies them. I do not hesitate to say, from the point of view of
His Majesty's Government, that this has been for the last three years, or a
little more, the most vexatious and anxious problem with which we have to
deal. It is not only that it is of the greatest importance that Allied unity
should be maintained, and that it cannot be effectively maintained unless
our Allies are in general agreement, it is not only because it is important
to us who are allied to both those countries that there should be some
understanding between them, but it is because, unless there is some under-
standing, we find it difficult to see how there can be confidence, settlement
and peace in Eastern Europe, when this war is over; and if there be not
392